Geopolitical Overview

This section contains several articles:

Geopolitical Overview, 2001
Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center and Chairman, Caspian Studies Program, JFK School of Government, Harvard University

To obtain the following articles, please contact USACC
E-mail: chamber@usacc.org

Geopolitical Overview, 2000
The Honorable Lawrence Eagleburger, former U.S. Secretary of State

Geopolitical Overview, 1999
Professor S. Frederick Starr

Geopolitical Overview, 1998
The Honorable Dick Cheney

Geopolitical Overview
Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center and Chairman, Caspian Studies Program, JFK School of Government, Harvard University

After centuries of foreign rule,1 Azerbaijan achieved political independence in 1991. In its first decade, under the leadership of President Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan has made great strides in strengthening that self-rule. Nonetheless, as a small state in a challenging geopolitical setting, the country confronts competing interests that demand a creative, agile foreign policy. The first half of 2001 has seen important developments that significantly affect Azerbaijan's geopolitical situation. The peace process with Armenia aimed at resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict accelerated in spring 2001. While holding great promise for stability and progress in the Caspian region, the process has generated rising expectations in Azerbaijan and Armenia for resolution and has heightened public concern about the conflict. A status quo-no war, no peace-that has been in place since 1994 seems to be fading. If the Azerbaijani public does not perceive significant steps forward in the resolution process, pressure for renewal of hostilities will grow. Whereas previously, U.S.-Russian rivalries complicated efforts to resolve this conflict, progress in negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan this past spring reflected newfound cooperation between Moscow and Washington.

Perhaps the most significant developments affecting Azerbaijan is the Bush Administration's clear articulation of strong support for building ties with the oil-producing states of the Caspian region as part of a national energy policy that aims to diversify and increase energy supplies. The Bush Administration has reaffirmed U.S. support for the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, President Bush has instructed key members of his cabinet to promote this project.

The administration's policy in the region is still restricted by Congress's imposition of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which limits government-to-government cooperation between the U.S. and Azerbaijan. Baku strives to develop closer ties with the U.S. and promotes American policies in the region. At the same time, the country suffers under U.S. sanctions; a fact not lost on the Azerbaijani people at the grassroots level.

Moscow seems to be at a turning point in its policies toward the South Caucasus, especially Azerbaijan. Under President Putin, Russia has initiated a more active, centralized policy toward the region. At the same time, Russia's new policy seems to represent more modest and realistic goals, as Moscow has shown greater flexibility on issues that it previously attempted to obstruct, such as resolution of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, and the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Nevertheless, Russia retains levers of destabilization in the region that it can use, as it deems necessary, to protect its interests in the region. Its ability and willingness to use such levers is evident in its heavy-handed policy toward neighboring Georgia.

A major strategic change that may have a crucial impact on Russia's policies in the South Caucasus is an emerging Russian-Turkish friendship. Moscow's level of perception of a Turkish threat has declined significantly, thus providing Moscow with more flexibility in the Caucasus.

Intense Russian-Iranian cooperation continues to be an important feature of the geopolitics of the Caspian region. Iran has demonstrated increasing activism in the Caucasus in 2001. President Khatami made his landmark visit to Russia in March 2001, and the Caspian region was high on the agenda in his discussions in Moscow. Tehran has exhibited uneasiness about the emerging peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and is attempting to play a more prominent role in the emerging security arrangements in the area. Relations between Baku and Tehran continue to be uneasy, especially due to Iran's close cooperation with Armenia. Moreover, as a multi-ethnic state in which a third of the population is ethnic Azerbaijani, Iran fears that Azerbaijan could be a source of attraction to this minority.

In recent years, Baku's foreign policy has become progressively more professionalized. Competent individuals from a wider spectrum of sectors are being enlisted to assist in the building of a qualified base for this policy. This should contribute to further successes for Azerbaijan in improving its geopolitical stance. Key milestones in 2001-2002, which should be tracked and will have an important impact on Azerbaijan's geopolitical situation include: results of the peace process with Armenia; unfolding developments in Iran potentially affecting regime stability and orientation; continued instability in Chechnya and the North Caucasus; refinement of Moscow's policy toward Azerbaijan and the peace process with Armenia under President Putin; discoveries and production of oil and gas; and realization, or the failure to realize, construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

¹ With the exception of 1918-1920 during the time of the independent Azerbaijan Democratic Republic.